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WHAT YOU SEE IS NOT ALWAYS WHAT
YOU GET: THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
LOAN PREPAYMENT PENALTIES
THOMAS

C.

MATTHEW

HOMBURGER*
PHILLIPS**

K.

INTRODUCTION

Commercial real estate loan documents often restrict the borrower's right to prepay the loan prior to maturity. Through these
restrictions, a lender seeks to ensure its investment stream over the
life of the loan. Where, as in the case of many insurance company
lenders today, the lender borrowed the funds it is lending and guaranteed the original source of those funds a fixed rate of return for a
definite period, a prepayment by the ultimate borrower is especially
problematic. Upon prepayment, since the lender is still obligated to
provide the original source of funds with its guaranteed fixed return,
the lender must find an alternative investment which will generate a
sufficient return to allow the lender to pay that guaranteed return
and still make a profit on the override. In a market with interest
rates lower than rates in effect when the original loan was made, a
lender's search for such an alternative investment often is futile.
This article explores the enforceability in Illinois of provisions
in commercial real estate loan documents which preclude or restrict
prepayment unless the prepayment is accompanied by a stated prepayment premium - whether the prepayment is a voluntary prepayment or follows an acceleration of the loan prior to its state maturity
date. First, various forms of prepayment clauses will be discussed;
second, judicial interpretations of these clauses will be described;
and finally, drafting suggestions and alternative remedies for lenders
will be presented.'
* Partner, Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, Chicago, Illinois. J.D., Columbia Law School,
1966.
** Associate, Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, Chicago, Illinois. J.D., John Marshall Law
School, 1986.
1. For a very complete discussion of prepayment restrictions in commercial
loans, see Stark, Enforcing Prepayment Charges : Case Law and Drafting Suggestions, 22 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 549 (Fall 1987).
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ANALYSIS

Forms of Prepayment Clauses

Clauses limiting prepayment sometimes establish a period at
the beginning of the loan term during which the borrower is prohibited from prepaying any portion of the outstanding loan balance.
This absolute prohibition is often followed by a subsequent period
coinciding with the latter part of the loan terms during which the
borrower may prepay the loan if it pays a specified prepayment premium. Another common form of prepayment restriction allows prepayment from the beginning of the loan term if the borrower pays
the stated prepayment premium.
The prepayment premium was traditionally stated as the product of a specified percentage multiplied by the principal balance of
the loan being prepaid. The specified percentage often decreased annually over the life of the loan. Such a provision was at issue in In
Re LHD Realty Corp.,2 a leading case in this area. In that case, the
promissory note provided that the prepayment premium was to be
calculated as follows:
No prepayment of principal may be made during the first ten (10)
loan years. After [the] tenth (10th) loan year, the right is reserved...
to prepay on any interest payment date all or any portion of the note
principal by paying a premium on the amount prepaid as follows:
During the eleventh (11th) loan year at five (5%) percent, declining
one (1%) percent per year thereafter to a minimum of par.
In the event of prepayment in full only, and in addition to the
foregoing, an additional prepayment premium will be payable in the
amount computed as follows: The average "additional interest" payments for the three (3) preceding years capitalized at thirty-three and
one-third (33 1/3%) percent.2
Another typical provision allows prepayments from the beginning of the loan term, requiring a premium on any prepayment
which exceeds a certain percentage of the original principal amount
of the loan. Such a clause was at issue in another leading Illinois
case, Slevin Container Corp. v. Provident Federal Savings & Loan
4
of Peoria,
where the promissory note provided:
[Borrowers) reserve the right to prepay this note in whole or in
part at any time, but [Lender] may require payment of note more
than six (6) months advance interest on that part of the aggregate
amount of all prepayments on the note in one year, which exceeds
twenty percent (20%) of the original principal amount of the loan.6
2.
3.
4.
5.

726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 329.
98 Ill. App. 3d 646, 424 N.E.2d 939 (1981).
Id. at 646, 424 N.E.2d at 939.
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A prepayment premium also may be expressed as an approximation of the unrealized interest the lender will forfeit as a result of
the prepayment.6 This approximation is often calculated by determining the present value of the difference between the interest payments the lender would have received pursuant to the loan but for
the prepayment and the product of the amount of principal prepaid
multiplied by the market interest rate prevailing at the time of the
prepayment. Theoretically, the lender may reinvest the principal
upon prepayment and the present value of the difference between
its anticipated return under the prepaid note and its actual return
at the market rate should represent the lender's direct damages as a
result of the prepayment. Such a provision might be as follows:
The premium (herein called the "Premium") to be paid in connection with a prepayment hereof shall be an amount calculated as
follows:
(a) There shall first be determined, as of the date fixed for prepayment (herein called the "Prepayment Date"), the amount, if any,
by which the Interest Rate hereunder exceeds the yield to maturity
percentage (herein called the "Current Yield") for the United States
Treasury Note (herein called the "Treasury Note") closest in maturity
to the Maturity Date hereof as published in The Wall Street Journal
on the first (lst) business day preceding the Prepayment Date (if (i)
publication of The Wall Street Journal is discontinued or (ii) publication of the Current Yield of the Treasury Note in The Wall Street
Journal is discontinued, the Holder shall, in its sole discretion, designate some other daily financial or governmental publication of national circulation); and
(b) The premium shall be the remainder of (x) minus (y) where
(x) is the present value of all unpaid installments of principal and
interest due under this Note from the date of prepayment to and including the original maturity date of this Note, discounted at the Current Yield and (y) is the outstanding principal balance of this Note as
of the prepayment date; provided that Borrower shall not be entitled
in any event to a credit against, or a reduction of, the indebtedness
evidenced hereby to be prepaid if the Current Yield exceeds the Interest Rate, or for other reason.
B.

Judicial Interpretationsof Prepayment Clauses

It has been generally acknowledged that a borrower is not entitled to prepay a loan unless the borrower has reserved the right to
do so in the loan documents.7 As a result, it has long been assumed
that a lender may condition a borrower's right to make a voluntary
prepayment, including requiring the borrower to pay a specified pre6. Id. at 647, 424 N.E.2d at 939.
7. Missouri, K & T R.R. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 156 N.Y. 592, 51 N.E. 309
(1898). See generally 55 Am.JUR. 2d § 397 (1971).
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mium upon prepayment. Case law is sparse regarding the enforceability of clauses establishing such a condition of prepayment.
In those cases where a court addressed a loan clause which required payment of a premium as a condition of allowing a prepayment, the court usually focused on the nature of the prepayment in
determining the enforceability of the clause. Courts appear to distinguish four types of prepayments. First, a prepayment may be precipitated by the borrower's request, such as where the borrower requests a payoff letter and proceeds to pay the balance of the loan
(including the prepayment premium) pursuant to that letter or
where the borrower simply tenders a lump sum payment to lender
which is greater than the required scheduled principal payment
under the loan. Second, a prepayment may be occasioned by a monetary default of the borrower combined with an acceleration of the
indebtedness by the lender pursuant to rights given to the lender
under the loan documents (this type of default is subsequently referred to in this article as a Monetary Default). Third, a prepayment
may be based upon a non-monetary default by the borrower combined with an acceleration of the indebtedness by the lender, such
as where the borrower transfers or sells the property which is security for the loan in violation of the loan documents (this type of default is subsequently referred to in this article as a Non-monetary
Default). Finally, a prepayment may be the result of the occurrence
of an event other than a default which is not directly or indirectly
within the borrower's control combined with an acceleration of the
indebtedness by the lender permitted by the loan documents by reason of the specific event, such as where the property which is security for the loan is destroyed by a fire or condemned (this fourth
event is subsequently referred to in this article as a Force Majeure
Default). Courts often refer to the first category of prepayment
above as voluntary prepayments and the second, third and fourth
categories of prepayments above as involuntary prepayments. Those
categories will be similarly referred to as Voluntary Prepayments
and Involuntary Prepayments subsequently in this article.
As a threshold matter, whether the prepayment is a Voluntary
Prepayment or Involuntary Prepayment, the amount of the premium due must be reasonable for the clause to be enforceable.' If
8. In In re Skyler Ridge, 80 Bankr. 500 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987), the Court considered the reasonableness of the amount of the required prepayment. The case involved the Voluntary Prepayment of a construction loan, and the bankruptcy court
applied principles pertaining to the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses in
considering the enforceability of the prepayment clause. The prepayment clause
provided:
The privilege is reserved to pre-pay all of the outstanding principal balance, all
accrued interest and all other sums due on this Note on any installment payment date ... provided the holder of this Note has been paid a prepayment
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the amount of the premium equals or closely approximates the actual damages which the parties calculate at the time the loan is
made that the lender may suffer as a result of a prepayment, it
would probably be considered reasonable.
In In re Schaumburg Hotel Ownership Limited Partnership,0
the bankruptcy court discussed the reasonableness of a prepayment
clause, stating: "In determining the validity of a prepayment clause,
the court must look to the damages the parties could anticipate at
the time the parties contracted . . . . [I]f the damages are easily
calculable [at the time of contracting] or the prepayment premium
will be disallowed."" In reaching its conclusion that the prepayment
clause was enforceable, the court applied principles of law often
used in determining the enforceability of liquidated damages provisions. It should be noted that the court estimated that the lender's
actual damages at the time of, and as a result of the prepayment,
were $2,510,557 and that the prepayment premium amounted to
only $1,721,216.'
premium equal to the greater of (a) the product obtained by multiplying (i) the
difference obtained by subtracting from ten and 75.100 percent (10,75%) the
yield rate of 11- 1/2
% U.S. Treasury Notes due November, 1995 (as such yield is
reported in The Wall Street Journal or similar publication on the fifth business day preceding the prepayment date) and (ii) the number of whole and
fractional years remaining between the prepayment date and the scheduled
maturity date of this Note, and (iii) the prepaid amount ....
Id. at 11.
The court refused to enforce the prepayment premium, holding that the amount
of the premium was unreasonable. The court based its conclusion on the findings that
the yield on U.S. Treasury notes "is systematically lower than the interest rate on
first mortgages for construction loans on apartment buildings, because the risk is
lower" and that the promissory note did not contain an adjustment for the difference
in rates. The court further observed that the formula was deficient because it did not
contain a discount for present value. "Application of the formula would permit [the
lender] to recover its entire lost interest at the time of prepayment, rather than over
the life of the loan." Id.
Although the court's ruling in In re Skyler seems harsh on lenders, it must be
considered against the backdrop of that particular bankruptcy proceeding. In that
case, several other creditors had agreed to accept a plan of reorganization if the bankruptcy estate were distributed without an allowance of the prepayment premium. The
court appeared to weigh this factor heavily in its consideration of the reasonableness
of the prepayment premium, stating that: "The court has equitable power to avoid
the enrichment of certain creditors at the expense of subordinate creditors, where
such a result would be unfair." Id. at 30. It is possible that in a non-bankruptcy
context, a court might more liberally compare the lender's return under the loan and
the lender's return under an alternative investment vehicle, such as U.S. Treasury
obligations, provided that any payments to the lender are adjusted for present value
purposes.
9. See the Drafting Suggestions, infra notes 51 through 52 and accompanying
text for a further discussion of the formulation of prepayment premiums.
10. 97 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
11. Id. at 953-54 (citing Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284,
1289-90 (7th Cir. 1985)).
12. For a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 22 through 25 and accompanying text. See also In re Kroh Brothers Development Co., 88 Bankr. 997
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For the purpose of the following discussion it is assumed that
the amount of the stated prepayment premium due is commensurate with the actual loss which the lender would suffer as a result of
the borrower's prepayment, and calculated accordingly at the time
the loan was made.
1.

Voluntary Prepayments

Courts usually allow prepayment premiums sought by lenders
as a result of a Voluntary Prepayment. In In First National Bank of
Springfield v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States,1" for example, the borrower desired to sell land which secured a loan from Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States ("Equitable"). In order to consummate the sale, the borrower
sought to pay off the loan to Equitable at closing. The borrower tendered payment of all amounts owed to Equitable other than the prepayment premium, but Equitable refused to release its mortgage.
The borrower then paid the prepayment fee, Equitable released its
mortgage and the borrower brought suit challenging the enforceability of the prepayment clause and seeking a refund of the premium
paid.
In considering the enforceability of the prepayment clause, the
court stated that "[riesolution of this matter ... turns on whether
the 'prepayment' by the [borrower] was voluntary, or whether in
fact it was the result of an acceleration of the indebtedness by Equitable."" In determining that the clause was enforceable, the court
stated that the borrower was allowed the privilege of paying off the
balance of the loan" by voluntarily maturing the debt .... In return, the mortgagee is authorized to collect [the prepayment premium] ....
[Sluch provisions have been routinely upheld and enforced where the [borrower's] election to call the loan to maturity
was voluntary.' 15
2. Involuntary Prepayments
Relying on various theories which are discussed below, courts
have often denied a prepayment premium sought by a lender which
is predicated upon an involuntary prepayment. 6
(Bankr. W.D. Miss. 1988) (prepayment clause analyzed as liquidated damages and
found enforceable because premium failed to provide discount to present value).
13. 157 Ill. App. 3d 408, 510 N.E.2d 518 (1987).
14. Id. at 414, 510 N.E.2d at 523.
15. Id.
16. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America v. Butler, 62 F. Supp. 1229
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Village of Rosemont v. Maywood Proviso State Bank, 149 Ill. App.
3d 1087, 501 N.E. 2d 859 (1987); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. I.H.D.A., 148 Ill. App. 3d 158,
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a. Monetary Defaults
A difficult issue for a court, and possibly the most troublesome
situation for a lender, arises where the borrower is in default under
a note or mortgage and the lender seeks to accelerate the indebtedness and collect the prepayment premium called for by the loan documents.1 7 Some courts have found that since a lender's acceleration
of a loan advances the maturity date of the debt, a payment after
acceleration is not a prepayment but rather a payment made after
maturity and, therefore, no premium is due." The lender thus must
make a choice of remedies. If the lender exercises its right to accelerate the indebtedness following a default, it waives the right to require a prepayment premium when the accelerated indebtedness is
paid.
In In re LHD Realty Corp., for example, the borrower missed
several monthly payments under the promissory note, and the
lender accelerated the indebtedness. The court first noted that prepayment premiums serve the valid purpose of compensating a
lender for the anticipated interest that it will not receive as a result
of a prepayment of the loan and second, a lender loses its right to a
prepayment premium when it accelerates the loan because acceleration "advances the maturity date of the debt so that payment thereafter is not prepayment but instead is payment made after maturity."' 9 In response to the argument that such a per se rule would
prompt borrowers to default intentionally (rather than prepay
loans) in order to avoid paying the prepayment premium, the court
stated that a borrower is unlikely to default because of the adverse
effect on its credit rating and because a lender always has the option
to sue the borrower for payments as they mature.2 Finally, the
court stated that if intentional defaults become commonplace,
courts in appropriate cases will refuse to enforce the acceleration ex498 N.E. 2d 697 (1986); Pacific Trust Co. v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan, 229 Cal. Rptr.
269, 184 Cal. App. 3d 817 (1986); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Uresti, 553
S.W. 2d 660 (Tex. App. 1977).
17. Slevin Container Corp. v. Provident Fed. Say. & Loan of Peoria, 98 Ill. App.
3d 646, 424 N.E.2d 939 (1981).
18. One might ask if in First National Bank of Springfield v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 157 Ill. App. 3d 408, 414, 510 N.E. 2d 518, 523
(1987), the borrower had sold the land which secured the loan but had not tendered
payment of the balance of the loan and Equitable had exercised its rights under the
due on sale clause under the mortgage, whether the prepayment would have been
deemed involuntary and the prepayment clause unenforceable. Id. Specifically, the
court stated: "We believe Slevin is factually inapposite from the matter presently
under consideration ....
Equitable never invoked its rights under the due-on-sale
clause, an event which would have triggered payment of the entire balance [of the
loan] without penalty." Id.
19. 726 F.2d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 1984).
20. Id. at 331.
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ception to the allowance of prepayment premiums."
A recent Illinois bankruptcy case involving a Monetary Default,
22
In re Schaumburg Hotel Ownership Limited Partnership,
appears
to be an exception to the above rule. In that case, the borrower defaulted on its payment obligations and the lender accelerated the
balance of the loan. The loan documents called for a ten percent
premium payable on the indebtedness prepaid. As previously discussed herein, the court first determined that the amount of the premium was reasonable.2 3 The court then determined that the premium was due because the loan documents explicitly provided that
the premium was owed "upon prepayment due to default or acceler'
ation."24
The court distinguished Slevin and Matter of LHD Realty
Corp., stating: "In both [of those cases], the loan documents provided that the debtor would incur a prepayment fee if it repaid the
amount before maturity. In neither case did the loan documents
provide that upon default, the lender could both accelerate the debt
and collect the prepayment fee."'25 Although the court's factual distinction is correct, it is not clear (based on the Slevin court's comments discussed below) that such distinction would have rendered a
different result in Slevin since the premium was due as a result of
the lender's acceleration of the maturity date of the loan.
b.

Non-Monetary Defaults

In Slevin, a case involving a Non-monetary Default, the borrower sold its interest in the property which secured the loan, thus
triggering the lender's right to accelerate because of the due on sale
clause contained in the mortgage. In reasoning nearly identical to
that of the court in In re LHD Realty Corp., the Slevin court stated
that "we believe that where the discretion to accelerate the maturity
of the obligation is that of the obligee, the exercise of the discretion
renders the payment made pursuant to the election one made after
maturity and by definition not prepayment."2 The court reasoned
that although the event which ultimately led to the acceleration was
the borrower's intentionally selling the property, the lender's choice
of acceleration was the lynch pin to the denial of the prepayment
premium: "if [the lender] so elected, the mortgage payments could
2' 7
have been continued as in the past.
21. Id.
22. 97 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
23. See supra note 10 through 11 and accompanying text.
24. In re Schaumburg, 97 Bankr. at 954.
25. Id. at 953.
26. Slevin Container Corp, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 648, 424 N.E.2d at 941.
27. For a discussion of this situation in the context of First Nat'l Bank of
Springfield, see supra note 18.
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The courts' rulings in In re LHD Realty Corp. and Slevin place
a lender in a precarious position. The protections afforded the
lender by these decisions are illusory. The court's rationale that a
borrower will hold so sacred its credit rating that it will not default
on a loan is misguided. A borrower's decision whether to default in
its obligations under the loan documents in an attempt to force an
acceleration and avoid the payment of a prepayment premium, is
probably more a function of the amount of savings the borrower will
enjoy as a result of the prepayment premium being disallowed
rather than the sanctity of a good credit rating. The court's suggested solution in In re of LHD Realty Corp., 8 that a lender continually sue a borrower for late payments and late charges is surely
palatable to only the most litigious of lenders and is especially
troublesome in light of the concern whether the new Illinois Foreclosure Act preserves the remedy of partial foreclosure.29
Finally, the contention that a lender may simply collect mortgage payments under the note in lieu of accelerating the indebtedness contradicts the agreement of the parties and denies the lender
one of the benefits of the parties' bargain. This applies in the case of
Monetary Defaults and in the case of Non-Monetary Defaults which
imperil the lender's security (such as the borrower's failure to pay
taxes and insurance premiums). It also applies where the expertise
of the borrower in operating the mortgaged property was a significant factor in the lender's original approval of the loan, but the borrower attempts to sell the property in violation of the loan documents. Even under In re LHD Realty Corp. where the court
addressed, but gave little or no weight, to the borrower's state of
mind30 as a factor in whether a prepayment premium is due, the
lender is faced with burdensome and usually costly litigation to
prove that the borrower intentionally defaulted on the loan in order
to enforce the prepayment premium agreed to in the loan
documents.
c.

Force Majeure Default

Where a lender seeks to collect a prepayment premium based
upon a payment of the indebtedness after a Force Majeure default
such as a casualty or condemnation, courts usually deny the lender
the right to collect a prepayment premium. Although courts have
not established a bright line test in these Force Majeure cases, what
appears to underlie most courts' reasoning is a strange combination
of principles of equity and contract law combined with an obvious
28. 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984).
29. See generally ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
actions).
30. 726 F.2d 327, 333 (7th Cir. 1984).

15-1501 (f) (1986) (allowing separate
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reluctance to enforce the prepayment clause in these cases.
For example, in Jala Corp. v. Berkeley Savings & Loan, 1 where
the lender sought and was denied a prepayment premium occasioned by a condemnation of the property securing the loan, the
condemnation proceeds were used to prepay the loan. Similarly, in
Chestnut Corp. v. Bankers Bond & Mortgage Co., 32 the lender
sought and was denied a prepayment premium when, following a fire
in the property securing the loan, the insurance proceeds were used
to prepay the loan as opposed to repair the improvements destroyed. In both cases, the court reasoned that requiring a prepayment premium would work an inequity on the borrower.33 In other
cases, such as Village of Rosemont v. Maywood Proviso State
Bank,3" the court applied principles of contract law and found the
prepayment clause ambiguous, and therefore unenforceable. In that
case, the prepayment clause provided that:
[i]f, during the term of the note [borrower] shall (whether voluntarily
or by operation of law) sell, convey, assign, mortgage, hypothecate, or
otherwise transfer or encumber the mortgaged premises [the lender
shall collect a prepayment premium]."
The mortgaged premises were condemned and the lender sought to
apply the condemnation proceeds in prepayment of amounts owed
under the loan. The lender argued that the prepayment premium
was due according to the terms of the loan documents because the
condemnation constituted a transfer of the property." The court determined that although condemnation constitutes a transfer by operation of law, the prepayment clause interpreted as a whole, was
ambiguous because the phrases "mortgagor shall [transfer]" and
"[transfer] by operation of law" were contained by the same sentence. " The court's holding appears more based on semantics than
logic and reason.
Many contract purists would argue that if the loan documents
clearly provide that a prepayment premium is due from the borrower in the case of prepayment, whether such a prepayment is due
by reason of Force Majeure Default or as a result of the lender's
acceleration of the debt following a Monetary Default or Non-Monetary default, courts should enforce the prepayment clause in any of
these situations since the loan documents are valid contracts. In In
Re LHD Realty Corp, after citing the above noted condemnation
31. 104 N.J. Super. 394, 250 A.2d 150 (1969).
32. 395 Pa. 153, 149 A.2d 48 (1959).
33. Jala Corp., 104 N.J. Super. at 402-03, 250 A.2d at 155; Chestnut Corp., 395
Pa. at 156-57, 149 A.2d at 50.
34. 149 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 501 N.E.2d 859 (1986).
35. Id. at 1089, 501 N.E.2d at 860.
36. Id. at 1091, 501 N.E.2d at 861-62.
37. Id. at 1089, 501 N.E.2d at 860.
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and casualty exceptions to the enforceability of prepayment clauses,
the court noted that "[t]hese exceptions have been read into contracts by courts and could presumably be modified by the parties
through appropriate contractual provisions.""8 The court in Village
of Rosemont made similar observations.3 ' However, notwithstanding
these observations, and unlike the approach which courts usually
employ in interpreting contract provisions, in cases involving Force
Majeure Defaults, courts often search for the slightest ambiguity as
a basis for declaring the entire prepayment clause ambiguous, construing it in the most restrictive manner, and often striking it from
40
the loan documents.
d. Trends
As demonstrated above, Illinois courts have strained to allow
borrowers to prepay loans without paying prepayment premiums in
cases of a loan prepayment following a Monetary Default. Notwithstanding the current state of the law in Illinois, however, one California court has held that a prepayment premium is collectable even
after the lender's acceleration based upon the borrower's default
under a promissory note and deed of trust. In Pacific Trust Co. v.
Fidelity Savings & Loan Association,"' the promissory note in question provided, in part:
Borrower may prepay the principal amount outstanding in whole
or in part ... on the condition that, in the event that the aggregate
amount of any prepayments during any calendar month period preceding and including the date of the latest prepayment, exceeds
twenty percent (20%) of the original principal amount of the loan [the
borrower will pay a prepayment premium. The borrower] agrees that
such [prepayment premium] shall be due and payable whether said
prepayment is voluntary or involuntary, including any prepayment
effected by the holder's exercise of the Acceleration Clause hereinafter set forth.4
The court considered whether by accelerating the indebtedness
due under the note the lender waived its right to the prepayment
premium.' 3 Citing In re LHD Realty Corp, the court stated that
38. 726 F.2d 327, 331 n.5 (7th Cir. 1984).
39. 149 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 501 N.E.2d 859.
40. In Chestnut Corp v. Bankers Bond & Mortgage Co., the court stated:
"Neither the bond nor the mortgages specifically or expressly provides for the
exact situation which has arisen, namely, a prepayment of the entire principal
[of the] loan with interest during the premium period, due not to a voluntary
election of prepayment but to a fire. If defendant (the obligee - mortgagee)
believed it should be entitled to the premium under these circumstances it
could easily and should have so provided on the bond and/or mortgage."
395 Pa. at 155, 149 A.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
41. 184 Cal. App. 3d 817, 229 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1986).
42. Id. at 819, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 271 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 823-24, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
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prepayment premiums are valid." The court rejected the argument
that Slevin and its progeny should control and the lender should be
denied the prepayment premium because it accelerated the indebtedness.4 5 The court reasoned that in Slevin, In re LHD Realty
Corp., and similar cases from other jurisdictions, the provisions restricting prepayment were ambiguous and could be reasonably interpreted as requiring the borrower's payment of a prepayment premium only if the borrower exercised its option to prepay the loan as
distinguished from a payment after the lender accelerated the indebtedness."' In those cases, the courts had construed the ambiguity
against the lenders because the lender presumably drafted the loan
documents and was responsible for the ambiguity."' In this case,
however, the note explicitly stated that the prepayment premium
was payable not only if the borrower voluntarily prepaid the loan,
but also in the event that the lender accelerated the indebtedness.49
Whether the California court's decision in Pacific Trust Co.,
and the bankruptcy court's decision in In re Schaumburg Hotel
Ownership Limited Partnershipwill stand as precedents allowing
subsequent Illinois courts to distinguish Slevin and its line of cases
remains to be seen. For lenders, the hope is that those cases are not
a temporary aberration but rather the beginning of a realization by
the courts that reasonable prepayment premiums serve to protect
the lender from potentially economically disastrous consequences
which arise from early prepayment following acceleration.
It is a maxim of Illinois contract law that a court, in interpreting a contract, should seek to determine and fulfill the intent of the
parties. 9 Where a contract is found to be unambiguous by a court,
"the intentions of the parties must be determined solely from the
language read in the agreement. ' 50 Certainly in case where the loan
documents clearly require a prepayment premium if the loan is accelerated by reason. of a Monetary Default or Non-Monetary Default, it is inequitable for the court to read out the stated intent of
44. Id. at 823, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
45. Id. at 824, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Village of Rosemont v. Maywood Proviso State Bank, 149 Ill. App.
3d 1087, 501 N.E.2d 859. Note, however, that even in Rosemont the court implied
that a clearly stated intent of the parties that a prepayment penalty was due notwithstanding the fact that prepayment was prompted by a condemnation of the mortgaged premises might lead a court to allow the lender to collect a premium following
condemnation. Id. at 1090, 501 N.E.2d at 862.
48. Pacific Trust, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
49. Wheeling Trust & Say. Bank v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Downers Grove, 142
Ill. App. 3d 333, 491 N.E.2d 866 (1986).
50. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. I.H.D.A., 148 Ill. App. 3d 158, 162, 498 N.E.2d 697,
700 (1986) (quoting Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 577, 594,
342 N.E.2d 65, 78 (1976)).
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the parties and require the lender to bear the actual loss which results to the lender when it is deprived of the yield on the loan for
the balance of the stated loan term. Further, in the case of a Force
Majeure Default followed by an acceleration under rights granted to
the lender in loan documents which were negotiated by sophisticated parties represented by competent counsel, the allocation of
loss resulting from a Force Majeure Default in the form of a reasonable prepayment premium should be respected by Illinois courts."
In either case, the courts would only be enforcing the stated intent
of the parties, expressed in the loan documents when the transaction
was entered into.
II.

DRAFTING SUGGESTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
FOR LENDERS

Although most Illinois cases have been quite explicit on the
point that if a lender accelerates a loan it waives its right to collect a
prepayment premium, In re Schaumburg Hotel Ownership Limited
Partnershipleave lenders a glimmer of hope that careful draftsmanship of a prepayment premium clause may persuade an Illinois court
to enforce the clause, even where a lender seeks to collect the premium predicated upon its acceleration of the indebtedness after a
Monetary Default or Non-monetary Default or the occurrence of a
Force Majeure Default.
A prepayment clause should clearly set forth that:
(i) a prepayment premium is due from the borrower if (a) the
loan is prepaid voluntarily by the borrower or, for any reason, is
paid off prior to the stated maturity date following a Force Majeure
Default pursuant to rights granted to the lender in the loan documents; or (b) the stated maturity date of the loan is accelerated by
the lender (in whole or in part) following the borrower's Monetary
or Non-monetary Default and the loan is then repaid, whether voluntarily or following action by the lender to enforce its rights under
the loan documents;
(ii) the borrower's payment of the prepayment premium in the
51. In Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th
Cir. 1988), the court made the following comments:
The parties to this transacted are, by any standard, highly sophisticated business people: Plaintiff is a partnership consisting of an insurance company and
two of Los Angeles' largest and most sophisticated law firms; defendant is another insurance company, dealing at arm's length and from positions of
roughly equal bargaining strengths ....
In an economy where interest rates
fluctuate, it is all but certain that one side or the other will be dissatisfied with
a long-term loan at some time. Mutuality calls for enforcing the contract as
written no matter whose ox is being gored.
Id. at 565, 568.
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event of a payment of the loan prior to the stated maturity date
predicated upon the occurrence of any of the above events is the
essence of the transaction and is necessary to prevent the lender
from suffering an actual loss by reason of the early payment (with
the nature of the lender's loss being described as specifically as possible) and, but for the lender having the right to demand and collect
the prepayment premium in such event, the lender would not have
entered into the transaction; and
(iii) the borrower is sophisticated in commercial matters and
has been represented by competent counsel.
Consideration should be given to referring to the premium as a
"loan fee" as opposed to "prepayment premium," the latter of which
seems to invite the Slevin inquiry whether payment after acceleration is a "prepayment."
Predicating the lender's right to collect a prepayment premium
on the occurrence of a Voluntary Prepayment or Involuntary Prepayment makes it imperative that the loan document clauses governing such prepayments, including the default, condemnation, casualty and any total or partial acceleration clauses, are carefully
drafted and ironclad. Based upon the actions of Illinois courts to
date, the result of an ambiguity in those clauses may well be that a
court would construe the ambiguity against the lender, regardless of
the negotiation which transpired in finalizing any of those clauses.
Lenders should also take steps to avoid a judicial finding that
the amount of the prepayment premium is unreasonable. Perhaps
the best formulation for this purpose is to make the amount of the
prepayment premium a function of the loss which the parties contemplate when the loan is made that the lender will suffer as a result of the prepayment rather than an arbitrary percentage which
may in fact result in a windfall to the lender. One such formula is
the amount of interest the lender would forfeit as a result of the
prepayment, mitigated by the amount the lender would earn by investing the prepaid principal amount in alternative investment vehicles (such as United States treasury instruments) which are available at the time of prepayment, with an appropriate adjustment for
present value. At least one case suggests that the amount of the prepayment premium should be adjusted to reflect the difference in
risk between an investment such as the loan and the alternative investment vehicle. 2
Finally, lenders in Illinois might avoid the quagmire of the existing law regarding the enforceability of prepayment premiums after a lender's acceleration of the loan by opting to partially foreclose
52.

See In re Skyler Ridge, 80 Bankr. 500 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
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the loan (to the extent it is permitted under the Illinois Mortgage
Foreclosure Act) or exercise its other remedies under the loan documents such as an assignment of rents and leases. Armed with a remedy which is an alternative to accelerating the indebtedness under a
loan, a lender may put additional pressures on a borrower that intentionally defaults under the loan in order to prompt the lender's
acceleration of the indebtedness. In this manner, a borrower may be
inclined to prepay a loan voluntarily rather than default in order to
prompt the lender to accelerate the indebtedness. Thus, a lender
may transform what would otherwise, in a court's interpretation be
an Involuntary Prepayment into a Voluntary Prepayment, rendering
the prepayment clause enforceable.
CONCLUSION

Although many commercial real estate loan documents contain
a clause prohibiting the payment of the loan prior to maturity and
imposing a prepayment premium on the borrower in the event of a
prepayment, such clauses are often interpreted in a manner detrimental to a lender. As a result, a lender may find itself in the
unenviable position of having its loan prepaid and the anticipated
interest stream thereunder cut short, while being required to make
guaranteed payments to the original source of its funds.
In determining whether to enforce a prepayment premium,
courts usually consider whether the prepayment was voluntary, in
which case prepayment premiums of a reasonable amount usually
are allowed, or involuntary, in which event prepayment premiums
usually are denied and the issue of reasonableness of the amount of
the premium is not considered. In distinguishing the two, courts
have held those prepayments which the borrower elects to make
prior to the maturity of the loan through acceleration or otherwise
are voluntary, and have held those prepayments which are made as
a result of a declared acceleration by the lender (based upon either a
Monetary Default or Non-monetary Default by the borrower) or of
the condemnation or destruction of the encumbered property are
involuntary.
In Illinois, it appears that when a prepayment is predicated
upon the borrower's default and the lender's acceleration of the indebtedness, regardless of whether the default was intentional on the
part of the borrower, the payment is deemed made after maturity.
In declaring an acceleration of the principal balance of the loan, the
lender is deemed to have waived its right to a prepayment premium.
In one Illinois bankruptcy case and in one California case, however,
the courts distinguished a prepayment clause from the prepayment
clauses which were held unenforceable under the traditional Illinois
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line of cases. The clauses in those cases specifically stated that a
prepayment premium would be due in the event of the lender's acceleration of the indebtedness under the note. Those cases suggest
that carefully and unambiguously drafted prepayment clauses may
be enforced, even where the prepayment is deemed involuntary or a
payment made after maturity.
Finally, where the lender has reason to believe that a borrower
defaulted under a loan in order to prompt the lender to accelerate
the indebtedness, it may be to that lender's advantage to forego acceleration and continue to collect monthly payments under the note
or, pursuant to the assignment of rents and leases, collect rents due
the borrower. In this manner, a lender may pressure a borrower to
make voluntary prepayment of the loan, in which event a reasonable
prepayment premium probably would be collectable.

